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‘Riskscapes’ as a heuristic tool for understanding environmental risks: The 
Eyjafjallajokull volcanic ash cloud of April 2010 
 
Abstract 
This paper looks at the 2010 ash cloud event associated with eruption of 
Eyjafjallajokull volcano in Iceland through the lens of actor network theory. Using 
this theory the shifting assignment of responsibility for the impact of the ash cloud 
can be traced amongst the various actors involved in the network focus on UK 
airspace. Mapping the relations between actors, in terms of their nature and strength, 
and how these change as the event unfolded can help to analyse the changing power 
relations and activation of relations to align the network. Understanding the activation 
of such links under the stress of an extreme environmental event and the network 
alignment it precipitates could have important implications for managing 
environmental risks. 
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Introduction  
 
Analysis of environmental risks and their management is an increasing pressing 
concern and one that requires an understanding of a multitude of complex responses 
of different human and physical agencies (Alexander, 2002, UNISDR, 2009 a, b). The 
complexity of understanding and integrating both the physical and human dimensions 
of risk have been addressed within the consultative framework emerging from the 
post-2015 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). HFA2 for disaster risk reduction 
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explicitly aims to understand risk through ‘understanding of the interaction of natural 
or physical and behavioural factors’ (UNISDR, 2013, p.6). Developing a conceptual 
framework that can help to address these issues is a key concern in risk management. 
This paper suggests that recent developments within actor network theory (ANT), 
particularly as outlined by Neisser (2014), could be of use in making these conceptual 
issues open to practical analysis.  
 
This paper uses the impact on aviation of the ash cloud resulting from the April 2010 
eruption of the Eyjafjallajokull volcano in Iceland as an illustration of how the 
conceptual or heuristic tool of actor network theory can be used to identify and 
illustrate the nature of risk to different actors and how the actor network is morphed 
through the event. The reshaped actor network then becomes the new riskscape upon 
which any future events and their management are played out. Through understanding 
the shifting topography of this new riskscape it should be possible to narrow down the 
range of likely scenarios that will be enacted in the next event thereby aiding the 
practical management of future risks.   
 
Actor Network Theory and Visualization 
 
The basic tenets of actor network theory have been discussed in depth by Latour 
(1987, 1996), Callon, (1986), Law, (1986; 1992) and Murdoch (1998) whilst Neiseer 
(2014) provides a detailed review of the key concepts of relevance to risk 
management and this paper will highlight those relevant to the issues dealt with in this 
paper.  
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ANT is more of a shifting conceptual framework for interpretation than an unified 
theory. It aids the researcher in identifying and interpreting the patterns and structures 
that emerge from the complex and dynamic relationships between changing entities.  
As noted by Latour: 
‘…an actant can literally by anything provided it is granted to be the source of 
action’ (Latour, 1996, p.373). 
ANT recognises that entities and relations co-evolve, stabilize and dissolve in a 
complex spatiotemporal ballet of flows and forms (Callon 1986, Murdoch, 1998). 
Within environmental risks this means that a seemingly stable entity such as a safety 
level is open to renegotiation when actors and their relations are stressed.  The stable 
entity acts as an initial barrier to alignment of the network for powerful actors who 
use their influential position in the network to guide the course of negotiation, setting 
in motion the process and direction of dissolution of the stable entity towards their 
own interests. Such activity, however, does not necessarily require new relations or 
new actors; power may be exerted through the novel use of existing relations between 
actors and through existing procedures meant to produce stable entities such as safety 
standards. 
 
The recognition that no single entity can operate without this complex and, in fact is 
defined and functional because of this complex of relations, means that the distinction 
between natural and social blurs as does the straight-forward assignment of causality 
to a single entity in the complex. This means that ANT rejects simple, deterministic 
explanation from both the natural an social sciences and instead focuses on the 
coproduction of knowledge that flows from the unfolding of the network.   
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Actors or actors within networks are ‘any element which bends space around itself, 
makes other elements dependent upon it and translates their will into a language of its 
own’ (Callon and Latour, 1981, p.286). These elements are linked by relations 
through which they are both defined and which defines the actions of the network as a 
whole. This means that any element or entity in the network can not be conceptualised 
in isolation from all the other entities, elements and relations that enable it to function 
as part of that relational network. Within this network agency becomes the ability or 
capacity to affect other elements in the network, to guide, to determine their actions. 
Similarly causality becomes something spread across the network as causes relates to 
the actions of a particular set of configurations of the network rather than the simple 
action and effect of a single entity. This means that there will be no single cause for a 
risk, but rather that particular configurations of actors and relations will produce risk 
and so it is the identification and management of configurations that reduce risk rather 
than management of single actors that should the focus of risk management.   
 
The actions of an actor network arise through the ‘process of translation’ (Latour, 
1990, Murdoch, 1998) which involves the negotiation, transformation and assignment 
of identities and capacities.  Through this process actors become mobilised as part of 
the network and form a functioning structure through which actions are co-ordinated. 
Interests of actors are aligned with a focal or focal actors and involves passage of 
actors through an obligatory passage point (Neisser, 2014) that makes these actors 
essential for the functioning of the network in that alignment or configuration. In this 
manner stable relations are established that enable the network to function as a 
seemingly ‘natural’ arrangement. ‘Inscription’ is an important part of the translation 
process and involves as the negotiated assignment of an actor to the prevailing script 
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or behavioural patterns inscribed by the focal actors or actors (Inkpen et al., 2007). A 
successful actor network is one in which these processes are virtually invisible, where 
the network itself and the actors within it view the current configuration of relations 
as ‘natural’ and unquestioned. It is only when under stress that the ‘natural’ nature of 
the configuration of a network is questioned. 
 
As Neisser (2014) notes, this approach provides a potentially powerful analytical tool 
for exploring issues central to risk management such as complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Analysing these networks is, however, a difficult task as although you can 
‘follow the actors’ (Callon, 1986, Latour, 2005), there may be no set or convenient 
pattern to the analysis. Description of actions, outcomes and relations within a 
configuration and their changes as the configuration evolves may provide an insight 
into the functioning of the network but these descriptions need to be collated to 
provide a coherent framework for thinking about the actor network. In this respect 
Peuker (2010, cited in Neisser, 2014) outline of three key questions for actor networks 
is a useful starting point. Peuker suggests that initially research should focus on the 
stability and durability of relations at the local level before moving onto the issues of 
strengthening or weakening relations may strategically establish network structures or 
configurations. Lastly, the analysis should focus on issues concerning multiplicity 
difference and fractionality in the network of relations, issues that could fragment the 
network. In the context of risk management, Neisser (2014) points to this last aspect 
of analysis as capturing the characteristics of risk – complexity, uncertainty and 
ambiguity – that risk management of the network will endeavour to dampen or 
accommodate.  
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Analysis of actor networks are often undertaken through detailed descriptions of 
actors and their relations whilst recognising that networks are constructed and 
reconstructed though flows between actors. The detailed analysis of actor networks is 
often aided if the network comes under stress as at this time the often latent and 
unnoticed relations between actors become active and channels for co-ordinating 
actions. As Latour notes in relation to the practice of science: ‘The impossible task of 
opening the black box is made feasible (if not easy) by moving in time and space until 
one finds the controversial topic on which scientists and engineers are busy at work. 
This is the first decision to make: our entry into science and technology must be 
through the back door of science in the making, not through the more grandiose 
entrance of ready made science’ (Latour, 1987, p.4). The ash cloud episode provides 
such an entry point for analysing risk management in the making and, in particular, a 
malleable network under stress. 
 
Deploying the metaphor of topographies may help to visualise and interpret the 
dynamics of actor networks. Neisser (2014) notes that the term ‘scape’ has been used 
in the literature (e.g. Bickerstaff and Simmon, 2009, Appadurai, 1998, Muller-Mahn 
and Everts, 2013) but often in a vague sense that is not elaborated upon once the 
metaphor is mentioned. Given the central role of metaphor in driving understanding 
(Hofstadter and Sander, 2013) it is important to explore the use of a topographic 
metaphor in the actor network theory. Inkpen et al. (2007) noted that the landscape 
metaphor has been widely used in the natural and social sciences as well (e.g. 
Waddington, 1942, Kaufmann, 2000, Law, 1986, Murdoch, 1998). The metaphor 
enables the researcher to visualise two distant points or areas coming closer together 
by the enfolding of the intervening space. The topographic metaphor means that space 
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can be viewed as distortable and dynamic across scales. Entities that form networks 
become closer to each other as they are inscribed and as their existence becomes 
increasingly a function of that network with the defining relations become ever more 
deeply entrenched (as illustrated in Figure 1). As in Inkpen et al. (2007), the metaphor 
can be used to visualise how the evolution of an actor network warps the topography. 
Within a relational landscape defined by the actor network strong relations that 
entrench and stabilize an entity could be thought of as producing deep, valleys within 
the landscape. As these relations become more entrenched they begin to distort the 
topography itself moving points and areas towards each other and dragging associated 
entities with them. Valleys in this topography become analogous to attractors as the 
network stabilizes relations that ensure the stability of the current entwrok 
configuration. Entities, howver, inhabit the landscape and deform it by the constant 
flows between them that are essential to their stability and continued existence. Latour 
(1997, p.197) suggests that ‘time and space are the consequences of the way in which 
bodies related to one another’ in a topological framework.  
 
Distances across this relational landscape are related to the power of the relations. The 
further from a valley (representing a set of stable relations) an entity is, the less likely 
it is to become fully entrenched into the established network. The evolution of this 
relational topography will result in the development of stable valley systems with 
flatter, plateau areas where relations are less well established and less constraining on 
entities. The plateaus represent zones where entities are relatively ambiguous in terms 
of their inscription into the actor network and can form sites that contest and 
challenge the prevailing network structure. As the actor network is a constantly 
evolving the stability of the valleys is not ensured but dependent upon the continued 
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enrolment and inscription of their defining relations between actors. Mapping out 
actor networks in this manner is similar to the risk cartography used by Beck and 
Kropp (2011) in relation to identifying and mapping infrastructures of risk. In the 
context of the risk of the ash cloud, the initial safety standard of ash concentration 
appears to be well inscribed and located within a deep valley of relations define by the 
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). As the crisis develops the seemingly fixed and 
technical nature of the standard emerges as a more contested entity. The safety 
standard becomes an entity on a plateau, suddenly open to relations that highlight and 
play upon its fluidity as a social construct.  The technical standard performs what 
appears to be a minor task of summarising technological understanding of the relation 
between ash and engines into a simple safety level. As Latour (1991) notes, however, 
this delegation of the activities of many actors in the network to a single, technical 
entity is a social as much as a technological act and this entity begins to unravel as its 
nature is contested by the same actors who had delegated their authority to it.  
 
Actor Network of Ash Cloud 
 
Figure 2 outlines the actor network of the ash cloud at the beginning of the eruption 
on 14
th
 April 2010. The time line of the eruption and its impact has been clearly 
documented elsewhere (Sammonds et al., 2010, Petersen, 2010, Schumann et al., 
2010) including the tele-conferences held by the CAA during April with the various 
actors in Table 1. The ash cloud event (referred to as E15 by the CAA as noted in 
Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock, 2013) is a useful candidate for analysis using ANT as at its 
heart is the negotiation of the meaning of risk and safety within a physical entity, the 
airspace. The airspace is the focus of the actor network in Figure 2 
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 as this is the physical and conceptual space within which the actions of all the actors 
are played out. Each actor has a different relation to the airspace which affects how 
they perceive the risk posed by the ash cloud. The volcano ejects ash into the airspace, 
so the airspace is a temporary store for the physical entity of ash. The ash, however, 
has specify physical characteristics as outlined by Sammonds et al. (2010) related to 
the physical characteristics of the volcano, the eruption intensity and the magma 
source feeding it. The specific volcano has a context of its own eruption history and 
the eruption history of Icelandic volcanoes which impact upon the predictability of 
eruptions of this type.  
 
Ash in the airspace is also dependent upon the prevailing meteorological conditions of 
the airspace and its relation to the volcanic eruption. Sammonds et al. (2010) state that 
periods of north to northwesterly airflow from Iceland occur about 6% of the time 
although this may be considered a conservative estimate. Physically, the storage and 
transportation of this type of ash from this volcano into European airspace is an 
unusual although not unpredictable event (Sammonds et al., 2010). As long as the 
combination of volcanic eruption and prevailing meteorological conditions continued 
then the characteristics of the ash in the atmosphere would not alter. 
 
The CAA has a legal and regulatory relationship to airspace whilst NATS provides air 
traffic control services for the airspace. Both are key actors in the closing of the 
airspace as this entailed the restriction of provision of air traffic services as stated 
within guidance provided by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) 
concerning airspaces affected by volcanic ash (Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock, 2013). The 
ICAO guidance of ash cloud was to avoid and a policy of zero ash concentration was 
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the basis of the guidance. The implementation of the ICAO guidance changed the 
relation of the other actors to the airspace such as commercial airlines that could no 
longer fly through it, as well as throwing into sharper focus existing relations such as 
the monitoring and modelling of the airspace by the Met Office. In actor network 
terms, the regulation of airspace by the CAA and NATS is deeply entrenched and 
restricts, through their legal right to enforce safety, elimination of the use of the 
airspace by airlines. 
 
The crisis evolved as the implications and impacts of the regulation of airspace on 
other actors became clearer. In this developmental process the risk present in the 
airspace became the subject of negotiation and the focus for competing perceptions of 
the risk (see Hutter and Lloyd-Bostcok, 2013, for a fuller discussion of the evolution 
and resolution of the regulatory issue as well as a discussion on the lines of funding 
for organisations). Actors in the network embark on actions that will activate latent 
relations to renegotiation their own and CAA/NATS relations to the airspace in order 
to align the network to their requirements with the key objective of opening up their 
pre-existing relations to the airspace, i.e. getting their commercial flights back in the 
air. The strategies of different actor can be analysed by following their actions and use 
of latent relations.  
 
The commercial airlines were initially quietly compliant with the closure of the 
airspace. As the duration of the crisis increased this altered and they challenged the 
relationship of specific actors in the network to the airspace. The Met Office 
modelling of the airspace was challenged through the media (e.g. Guardian report, 
2010, Telegraph report, 2010a and b) and through the use of special flights by airlines 
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to illustrate the lack of ash risk within the closed airspace. The challenges focused on 
the scientific responsibility for the definition of the problem that seemed to lay with 
the Met Office. The challenges used a model of science as an accurate and fact-based 
process to question the modelling used by the Met Office to predict ash 
concentrations in the airspace. The inherent uncertainties in the modelling of physical 
reality were mentioned by the Met Office but were often interpreted as confirming the 
concerns of the airlines about the lack of rigour in the science. Challenging the 
privileged scientific relation of the Met Office to the airspace was a strategy 
employed to bring into doubt the physical reality of the ash risk and to put pressure on 
the Met Office though the public arena via the media and though the government as 
sponsor of the Met Office. The success of this strategy can be illustrated by the 
response of the Met Office in undertaking more intensive monitoring of the airspace 
as well as commissioning more flights to gather more data to confirm their modelling.  
 
The impetus of the airlines to challenge the prevailing relations could be viewed in the 
context of their perception of the ash cloud risk relative to the economic risk imposed 
by the closure of airspace. The ash cloud, from their perspective, was a relatively 
small risk to any individual flight and one that was unquantifiable and abstract as well 
as being a risk over which they had no clear control or responsibility.  The increasing 
and cumulative risk of economic damage that the day to day grounding of their 
aircraft caused would, however, be more visible to the airlines and one over which 
they had a clearer responsibility and ability to act upon.  The cumulative economic 
impact of the ash cloud risk became a small but increasing risk to the airlines as the 
consequences of the grounding of planes produced actions that reflected the corporate 
responsibility of these actors. It  provided the impetus to activate latent relations to try 
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to align the network to alter the impact of the ash cloud risk. The physical nature of 
the risk could not be altered in the sense that the volcanic eruption and continued 
prevailing meteorological conditions were beyond the control of any agency. The 
definition of the risk as defined through a safety standard, was more amendable to 
negotiation hence the activation of the media and the questioning of the modelling of 
ash concentrations.  
 
It is interesting to note that the airlines did not respond as a single actor but had 
differentiated access to the negotiation process as noted by Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock 
(2013). Low cost airlines such as Easyjet initially had no place or input into the tele-
conferences with the CAA despite having the largest number of short-haul flights in 
the affected airspace. This reflects that, initially at least, the pre-existing network of 
relations between actors involved in the aviation sector, with privileged access for 
preferred airlines, was maintained in the network that developed to resolve the 
regulation crisis. Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock also note that the airlines involved in the 
negotiation process with the CAA were cooperative rather than confrontational, 
reflecting a difference in stance between their public and private approaches to 
activating and using relations to align the network to their ends. The airlines had 
different strategies for aligning the network depending upon the nature of the relations 
between themselves and other actors. In the case of the CAA a formal setting 
constrained or even defined the nature of acceptable actions that could be taken and so 
the form of negotiation. 
 
The renegotiation of the risk of the ash cloud seems to have hinged on the ability of 
all parties to move the burden on responsibility away from challenges to the science 
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and regulation of the risk to the engineering aspects of the aircraft. The involvement 
of aircraft and engine manufacturers from the first teleconference hosted by the CAA 
illustrates their central role in the redefinition of risk. It was not until 20
th
 April, 
however, that these actors stated that aircraft and engines would tolerate operating in 
ash concentrations of 2x10
-3
 g/m
3
. The joint statement released on 20
th
 April 
(https://www.caa.co.uk/docs/1357/F0000977DisclosureLog.pdf) highlights the 
importance of attributing responsibility for the risk in the minds of the participants. 
The third point states the new safe limit for ash concentrations and the use of the Met 
Office scientific models that predict its locations. Preceding this point are two others 
that highlight the lack of available data for making any decision concerning safety and 
safety measures in place before the present crisis. The data upon which the new safe 
level were based, the detailed examination of past ash cloud encounters (particularly 
the aircraft encounter with the Mount Redoubt eruption in 1989 and the KLM B747-
400 incident in the same year), are the same data that had been used to justify the zero 
concentration policy of the ICAO. The ICAO policy seemed to be based on 
precaution rather than known safety concerns at low concentrations of ash as was 
confirmed by the advisors from the FAA and US Weather Service. 
 
The new standard represented the limit to which the aircraft and engine manufacturers 
were prepared to concede without further data or analysis of the impact of ash 
concentrations on airframe and engines. The timescale within which a decision was 
required were not sufficient to undertake any detailed scientific analysis or new 
experiments. Such analyses would be expected to form the scientific and empirical 
basis for defining operational limits. Importantly, such analyses would form the 
scientific basis for arguing that any adverse result of applying these limits was not the 
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responsibility of these actors. The responsibility for such adverse effects would then 
have to be sought outside of the actions of these actors such as with the actions of the 
captain, maintenance schedules and the like.  
 
Figure 3 outlines how the new limits were dependent upon a redefinition of 
responsibility by the actors and illustrated a change in the entrenched nature of 
relations between actors. The CAA retains its clear legal responsibility for the 
defining the risk in the airspace and hence deciding if the risk forces it closure. 
Aircraft and engine manufacturers had previously had a minor role in the 
responsibility for the decision as the zero tolerance level was based on a clear pre-
cautionary principle from the ICAO. Demands, from different actors, to identify  a 
specific tolerable fly limit has forced both these actors into having a share of the 
responsibility for defining the risk within the airspace. Willingness to participate in 
this negotiation is, like the airlines, based on the relative significance of the risk posed 
by a rare ash event relative to the increased economic risk of losing custom from the 
airlines should the no fly policy affect their economic viability. Aircraft and engine 
manufactures have therefore taken on an aspect of responsibility for defining the risk 
and so, potentially, the liability should this definition prove to be erroneous.  
 
In the figure, the changing nature of relations between actors can be visualized. 
Aircraft and engine manufacturers have deeply entrenched relations to the airlines; 
their mutual dependence is clear. The relation to the CAA for assessing the ash risk is 
a new one but one that benefits from established relations from the safety context. The 
aircraft and engine manufacturers are taking on a new role by providing technical 
assurance of the risk associated with a specific concentration of ash. Ideally this 
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assurance would be based on scientific analysis of data associated with real incidents 
plus appropriate experimental work. Such a framework of empirical and experimental 
data would mirror the existing approach to defining safety within this sector hence the 
detailed discussion of the lack of such data within the joint statement. The aircraft and 
engine manufacturers have now taken on a role in defining the safe level of ash 
through stating the technical standard, adding a further dimension to definition of this 
risk. Hutter and Lloyd-Bostock (2013) highlight the importance of this new 
responsibility for defining risk through the quote from the Chief Executive of the 
CAA, Andrew Haines in an interview on Radio 4 on 3
rd
 May 2010: 
 
‘If we’ve had the assurances from manufacturers that we have now at the start of     
the crisis, the response would have been different ….  I suspect that the manufacturers 
knew there was an acceptable level of safety but what hadn’t happened is that they 
were prepared to underwrite that and validate it’. 
 
The new relation between the CAA and aircraft and engine manufacturers in terms of 
responsibility also forces the forging of a change in the nature of the relations between 
the other actors. As noted in the joint statement, the Met Office retains responsibility 
for defining the presence of the ash risk but now has the additional requirement to 
identify and map different levels of ash concentration. The technical ability to do this 
plus the ability of the current modelling to undertake such detailed analysis are new 
requirements in the Met Office’s relationship to the other actors. The CAA now has a 
different relationship to ash risk in the airspace as it now sees it as a spatially 
differentiated risk and a risk that is now more complicated to identify . The airlines 
have a more nuanced airspace for their aircrews to navigate through and so have 
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changed the nature and risk of flying in relation to an ash cloud. In addition, the 
airlines may have resolved a short-term economic risk but may have to change their 
maintenance schedules to ensure that there is no cumulative damage to the airframe or 
engines caused by flying through low concentrations of ash. In this analysis the 
airlines perceive the longer term risk as acceptable and may even subsume it within 
their general concept of long-term ‘wear and tear’ and so remove it completely from 
their analysis of ash risk.  
 
Entrenchment and Evolution  
 
The evolution of the actor network means that the risk of an ash cloud evolves as 
well. As new relations are established and become entrenched then the potential 
evolution of the actor network becomes constrained. Since event E15 there have been 
a series of developments that highlight the continued entrenchment of the new 
relations and their incorporation and legitimation within existing networks of 
particular actors. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the incident the ICAO produced a number of working 
papers specifically to address issues concerning safe ash concentrations (e.g. IVATF, 
2010a, IVATF 2010b and Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan, 2014). Working paper 
IVATF/1-WP/13 (IVATF, 2010a) produced at the first meeting of the International 
Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVAF) pointed out the lack of key scientific information 
and standardized testing concerning the airworthiness of aircraft in low ash 
concentrations. It also highlights the additional complexity in certification and 
operational complexity the specification of any low concentration limit would 
18 
 
involve. This implies that the actor network needs to evolve throughout the whole 
aviation network to accommodate the change in ash risk definition. This is also seen 
by the ICAO issuing on 12
th
 July 2010 a State Letter differentiating ash contamination 
into three levels of low (2x10
-3
 g/m
3
 or less), medium (more than 2x10
-3
 but less than 
4x10
-3
 g/m
3
) and high (above 4x10
-3
 g/m
3
) thus moving away from its zero 
concentration policy (Working paper IVATF/1-WP/21- IVAFT, 2010b). This 
immediately means that the CAA is able to define the ash risk with reference to a new 
set of guidelines that provide more flexibility to keep the airspace open in a volcanic 
event. The new guidelines also put more demands on each VAAC to provide 
information on ash concentrations and cloud movements. The working paper is at 
pains to point out that the VAAC need to supply enhanced products capable of 
interpretation by operators and is concerned about the conservative nature of the 
models used but notes that since E15 there have been work to improve information on 
model parameters.  
 
By the publication of the Volcanic Ash Contingency Plan: North Atlantic Region in 
2014, the dissipation of responsibility for the identifying and defining the ash risk had 
filtered through the aviation network and specific roles assigned. Section 4 of the 
report outlines these with, for example, pilots now expected to provide as much 
detailed information as possible on the nature of the volcanic contamination and 
record this on a standardised form. This information is then disseminated through to 
relevant VAAC and meteorological organizations to aid in modelling. Likewise, 
similar standardised reports are to be completed by post-flight inspections, 
maintenance with all the data gathered and stored in a global data repository to aid in 
the analysis of the impact of ash on airframes and engines. These new procedures 
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have not resulted from a change in the relations within the actor network but rather 
have used existing relations concerning pilot reporting, maintenance logs and the 
aviation organisations to provide a conduit for the collation of information deemed 
relevant to modelling ash cloud dynamics and to the impact of ash on aircraft. This 
has dissipated responsibility for risk identification and definition across the network 
through the formalization of data collection and collation, focusing on defining what 
is acceptable as data about ash events. On the basis of this information network the 
ICAO will review safety policy in relation to ash clouds, largely using the existing 
network of actors and relations.  
 
Awareness of the risk associated with ash clouds now has a prominent place in the 
ICAO. Risk definition of ash has been dispersed across the existing actor network of 
the aviation industry. The CAA retain the regulatory authority for airspace closure but 
their responsibility is based on an underlying network of actors all with clear roles 
that feed information to other actors capable of defining tolerances of aircraft to ash as 
well as the modelling dynamics of the ash cloud itself. Closure of airspace may still 
reside with one organization but justification for that decision is now dispersed and 
fragmented so making it less clear where ‘blame’ lies.  Redefining the ash cloud risk 
has slightly shrunk the CAA responsibility for air closure whilst the expanding the 
defining responsibilities for other actors which now occupy part of their normal 
operating conditions. The risk of an ash cloud seems to have been successful 
incorporated into the general risk management behaviour of the network. The event 
E15 seems to have generated little change in the network. The move from zero 
concentrations to identifying a ‘safe’ or ‘tolerable’ concentration of dust may, 
however, be viewed differently. Brannigan (2011), for example, views this movement 
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as an illustration of an emerging paradigm within the aviation industry from one 
where air safety was focused on passenger safety to a new paradigm that privilege 
protecting airlines from disruption. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper outlines how mapping actor networks could be used to visualise the 
evolution of power relations as the impact of an environmental event unfolds. Using 
the metaphor of topography the establishment of a stable network of relations and 
entities provides a deeply entrenched valley which translates and inscribes practices 
and behaviour to maintain its existence. Getting out of the valley is difficult as it 
involves breaking away from the established relations that help to define the entity. 
The emergence of a safe level of ash for flying represents a negotiation over the 
definition of a safety level between different actors, representing a set of deeply 
entrenched by connected valleys in the landscape metaphor. Initially the safe 
concentration of ash was clearly defined and entrenched within the authority of the 
CAA.  
For the ash cloud from the Eyjafjallajokull volcano, the interests of all the actors 
converge on the airspace where their relations became intertwined and, as the crisis 
evolved, relations were activated to renegotiate the definition of ‘safe levels’ in 
relation to ash concentrations. The CAA was the key actor with legal responsibility 
for the safety of the airspace but it began a process of diversifying the nature of this 
responsibility through active engagement with other actors such as airlines and engine 
manufacturers to redefine what was meant by the term ‘safe’ in the context of a crisis 
that was cumulatively impacting upon the stability of the actors. The inclusion of 
engine manufacturers was critical in this process of network alignment as their 
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reinterpretation of existing information permitted a change in the strict definition safe 
ash levels. Although responsibility for declaring the airspace ‘safe’ still lay with the 
CAA, the negotiation process meant that any decision now had a clear line to 
evidence from engine manufacturers as its basis. ‘Safe’ ash levels is now a negotiated 
term defined by and aligned to the network and its powerful actors.   
 
The redefinition of ‘safety’ in this context has become embedded within the existing 
protocols and practices of the different actors. Identification and monitoring of ash 
concentration is now part of the normal practice of reporting for pilots. Engine 
maintenance will now consider potential ash damage as a standard part of protocols. 
The Met Office will need to develop differentiated modelling for ash concentrations 
and the CAA will employ a differentiated protocol to closing airspace. The entity of 
‘safe levels’ is still within the valley of the CAA responsibility, but its links to the 
other actors have been activated and more fully developed than before and this has 
resulted in the emergence of practices by other actors that not only link them more 
stronger to the entity but also are instrumental in defining it.  
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Figure 1 Visualization of topographic metaphor in actor network. The black 
valleys represent entrenched, stable entities and relations that define particular actors 
in the network. The black spot on the plateau region represents an entity whose 
definition is contested and which could move towards either valley depending on the 
negotiations and power relations s between the actors. 
Figure 2 Representation of the actor network for the ash cloud event. The 
thickness of the lines represents the strength and activity of relations. 
Figure 3 Representation of the actor network for the ash cloud event as the crisis 
evolved. The increased strengthening and activation of links between airlines, engine 
manufacturers and the CAA is observed as is their increased proximity representing 
their increased connectivity in negotiation the new safe level of ash concentration.   
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Organisations Call 1 Call 2 Call 3 Call 4 Call 5 Call 6 Linked 
Airframe 
Manufacturers 
       
Airbus X X X X X X  
ATR       X 
BAE Systems – 
Regional Aircraft 
    X X  
Boeing  X X X X X X  
Bombardier Aerospace    X X X  
Bombardier Shorts 
Brothers 
   X X X  
Cessna Textron       X 
Dassault     X X  
Embraer    X X X  
Gulfstream       X 
        
Engine Manufacturers        
General Electric X X X X X X  
Honeywell International    X X X  
International Aero 
Engines 
     X  
Pratt and Whitney X X X X X X  
Pratt and Whitney 
Canada 
  X X X X  
Rolls Royce X X X X X X  
SNECMA  X X X X X  
Williams International       X 
        
Air Navigation Service 
Providers 
       
Eurocontrol X       
FAA Air Traffic 
Control 
X X X X X X  
Metro France (Toulouse 
VAAC) 
 X  X    
Met Office, Iceland       X 
Met Office, Netherlands  X   X   
Met Office, UK 
(London (VAAC) 
X X X X X X  
NOAA (Anchorage 
VAAC and Washington 
VAAC) 
X X X X X X  
NATS X X      
US Air Force Met 
Service 
     X  
Scientific Agencies        
CEV X       
Chief Scientific 
Adviser, UK 
   X X X  
FAA Weather Group X X X X X X  
Facility for Airborne 
Atmospheric Sciences, 
UK (FAAM) 
X X X X X X  
NCAS  X X X X X  
NERC X       
NLR, German Research 
Centre 
    X   
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USGS      X  
        
Operators        
Air Canada      X  
Air France      X  
Astraeus       X 
British Airways X  X  X   
EasyJet       X 
FlyBe    X X X  
Bmi     X X  
Lufthansa    X X X  
Monarch    X X X  
Ryanair      X  
Thomas Cook    X X X  
Thomson Airways    X    
United Airlines      X X 
Virgin Atlantic     X X  
        
Representative Bodies        
Aerospace Industries 
Association 
     X  
General Aviation 
Manufacturers 
Association 
     X  
Oil & Gas UK       X 
        
Regulators        
AESA, Spain   X X X X  
CAA, Netherlands X X X X    
CAA, Norway    X    
CAA, UK X X X X X X  
DGAC, France X X X X X X  
EASA X X X X X X  
FAA Airworthiness 
Certification 
X X X X X X  
Irish Aviation Authority   X X X X  
MAA, UK Military 
Aviation Authority 
   X X X  
Transport Canada    X X   
UK DfT  X X X  X  
 
Conference calls from Saturday 17 to Friday 23 April 2010 (no call on 21 April). 
Linked organisations were in contact with the proceedings. 
Source: Kelleher, P. 2010. Volcanic Ash International Teleconference 17-23 April, 
2010 
 
